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GHSA-3rfq-4wpf-qqw3

LowCVSS 3.7 / 10
Published May 6, 2026·Last modified May 6, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

ResourceBundleMessageSource maintains two caches: messageCache (bounded at 100 entries via ConcurrentLinkedHashMap) and bundleCache (unbounded ConcurrentHashMap). The bundleCache is keyed by (Locale, baseName) where the locale originates from the HTTP Accept-Language header. In applications that explicitly register a ResourceBundleMessageSource bean and serve HTML error responses, an unauthenticated attacker can exhaust heap memory by sending requests with large numbers of unique Accept-Language values, each causing a new entry in the unbounded bundleCache. Unlike GHSA-2hcp-gjrf-7fhc and the sibling messageCache (both bounded), bundleCache was not updated to use a bounded cache implementation.

Details

The bundleCache is initialized in inject/src/main/java/io/micronaut/context/i18n/ResourceBundleMessageSource.java at line 150:

// ResourceBundleMessageSource.java:139-152
protected Map<MessageKey, Optional<String>> buildMessageCache() {
    return new ConcurrentLinkedHashMap.Builder<MessageKey, Optional<String>>()
            .maximumWeightedCapacity(100)    // ← BOUNDED ✓
            .build();
}

protected Map<MessageKey, Optional<ResourceBundle>> buildBundleCache() {
    return new ConcurrentHashMap<>(18);      // ← UNBOUNDED ✗
}

The resolveBundle() method at line 169 inserts into bundleCache with no eviction policy:

// ResourceBundleMessageSource.java:169-185
private Optional<ResourceBundle> resolveBundle(Locale locale) {
    MessageKey key = new MessageKey(locale, baseName);
    final Optional<ResourceBundle> resourceBundle = bundleCache.get(key);
    if (resourceBundle != null) {
        return resourceBundle;
    } else {
        Optional<ResourceBundle> opt;
        try {
            opt = Optional.of(ResourceBundle.getBundle(baseName, locale, getClassLoader()));
        } catch (MissingResourceException e) {
            opt = Optional.empty();
        }
        bundleCache.put(key, opt);    // NO SIZE CHECK — unbounded growth
        return opt;
    }
}

The attack path requires:

  1. The application registers a ResourceBundleMessageSource bean (non-default, requires explicit user configuration).
  2. The attacker sends requests that trigger HTML error responses — i.e., requests with Accept: text/html to any URL that returns an error (e.g., 404 for any non-existent path).
  3. Each request uses a unique Accept-Language value (e.g., zz-AA, zz-AB, …).
  4. DefaultHtmlErrorResponseBodyProvider.error() calls messageSource.getMessage(code, locale)CompositeMessageSource delegates to ResourceBundleMessageSourceresolveBundle(locale) inserts one entry per unique locale into bundleCache.

For locales that don't match any bundle file, ResourceBundle.getBundle() throws MissingResourceException and Optional.empty() is stored — a low-cost sentinel. For locales that DO match a bundle, a full ResourceBundle object is retained in memory. In either case, the map itself and the MessageKey objects grow without bound.

Note: the messageCache is bounded at 100 entries but does not prevent bundleCache growth, as resolveBundle() is called directly (bypassing messageCache) whenever a messageCache miss occurs.

PoC

Against a Micronaut application with a ResourceBundleMessageSource bean registered (e.g., @Bean ResourceBundleMessageSource messages() { return new ResourceBundleMessageSource("messages"); }):

# Flood bundleCache with unique locales via HTML error path
for i in $(seq 1 100000); do
  curl -s -o /dev/null \
    -H "Accept: text/html" \
    -H "Accept-Language: zz-$(printf '%04d' $i)" \
    "http://localhost:8080/nonexistent-path-$(printf '%06d' $i)" &
  [ $((i % 200)) -eq 0 ] && wait
done
wait

Each unique zz-XXXX tag creates one new bundleCache entry. The MessageKey (Locale + baseName) and map overhead cost approximately 100-200 bytes per entry. At 100,000 entries, heap consumption from the cache alone reaches roughly 20 MB — significant in resource-constrained deployments. If a locale matches a bundle file, retained ResourceBundle objects cost substantially more per entry.

Impact

  • Only affects applications that explicitly register a ResourceBundleMessageSource bean (not the default configuration).
  • Requires the ability to send HTTP requests with Accept: text/html headers and control over the Accept-Language value.
  • Memory grows approximately 100-200 bytes per novel locale (for non-matching locales) up to several KB per locale if bundles are found. Sustained attack over time causes gradual heap exhaustion.
  • Partial availability impact (A:L) under sustained attack in long-running services.

Recommended Fix

Apply the same bounded-cache pattern used for the sibling messageCache:

// In ResourceBundleMessageSource.java — replace buildBundleCache()
protected Map<MessageKey, Optional<ResourceBundle>> buildBundleCache() {
    return new ConcurrentLinkedHashMap.Builder<MessageKey, Optional<ResourceBundle>>()
            .maximumWeightedCapacity(50)    // small — one entry per (locale, baseName)
            .build();
}

The number of distinct resource bundle files is bounded at compile time; a limit of 50 entries is more than sufficient for any realistic i18n configuration while fully preventing unbounded growth.

Risk Scores
Base Score
3.7

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
3.4

Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.

EPSS
0.21%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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