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GHSA-3m6q-jj5j-38c9

HighCVSS 7.5 / 10
Published Jun 19, 2026·Last modified Jun 19, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

Oj::Doc#each_child, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON.

Details

Two-step chain in ext/oj/fast.c:

  1. doc_each_child (~line 1501) increments doc->where past the where_path[MAX_STACK = 100] array with no bounds check, and never restores it (doc->where-- is missing). Calling each_child recursively from inside the yield block therefore drives doc->where beyond the array.

  2. On the next entry (~line 1478) the function copies the path into a stack-local buffer:

    Leaf  save_path[MAX_STACK];           // 800-byte stack buffer
    size_t wlen = doc->where - doc->where_path;
    if (0 < wlen) {
        memcpy(save_path, doc->where_path, sizeof(Leaf) * (wlen + 1));
    }
    

    When the previous recursive call left doc->where past where_path[100], wlen exceeds MAX_STACK and the memcpy overflows save_path on the C stack.

The Oj::Doc parser imposes no JSON nesting-depth limit (it relies on a C-stack pressure check), so deeply nested attacker input reaches this path.

Proof of Concept

require 'oj'
depth = 200
payload = '[' * depth + '1' + ']' * depth
Oj::Doc.open(payload) do |doc|
  r = lambda { doc.each_child { |_| r.call } }
  r.call
end

Recursion depth <= 99 iterates normally; depth >= 101 aborts. lldb backtrace on the affected build (ruby 3.3.8 / arm64-darwin24):

SIGABRT
#2 __abort
#3 __stack_chk_fail
#4 doc_each_child   (oj.bundle, fast.c)

Impact

Reliable denial of service: any endpoint that calls Oj::Doc.open(untrusted) { |d| d.each_child ... } recursively can be crashed with a small deeply-nested payload. On builds with a stack protector (the default, -fstack-protector-strong) the canary aborts the process before the saved return address is used. The Step-1 heap OOB writes into struct _doc fields do occur, but are masked in practice because the Step-2 stack overflow crashes first; turning them into anything beyond a crash has not been demonstrated.

Patches

Fixed in 3.17.3: doc_each_child now bounds-checks before incrementing doc->where (raising Oj::DepthError) and restores doc->where after the loop, matching the existing each_leaf pattern. Verified on the fixed build: depth >= 101 raises a clean Oj::DepthError instead of aborting.

Credit

Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).

Risk Scores
Base Score
7.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.26%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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