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GHSA-3h9h-qfvw-98hq

HighCVSS 7.5 / 10
Published Apr 6, 2026·Last modified Apr 6, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

While fuzzing openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer, Valgrind reports a conditional branch depending on uninitialized data inside generic_unpack. This indicates a use of uninitialized memory (CWE-457). The issue is reproducible with the current OSS-Fuzz harness and a single-file PoC.

Details

Environment:

  • Tooling: valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes
  • Target: openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer
  • OS: Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS focal x86_64
  • openexr version and Git-commit hash: openexr 3.4.2 | commit fd657e8a41e157e5841c7cc2e2a5efe094b069a1 (grafted, HEAD -> main, origin/main, origin/HEAD)

Function: generic_unpack

Possible root cause (based on observed symptoms): The unpacker is branching on bytes in a scratch buffer that were never written because the decode step didn’t fully populate it.

  • The first use flagged is in generic_unpack(). That function reads from the decompressed/expanded pixel buffer to scatter data into the framebuffer. A “conditional jump depends on uninitialised value(s)” means it’s consulting bytes in that buffer before they were written.
  • Valgrind says the uninitialised value “was created by a heap allocation (malloc)”, not the stack: this matches a per-tile/per-scanline decode scratch buffer allocated in exr_decoding_run().

Valgrind Trace (top frames):

==454== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
==454==    at 0x4539BE: generic_unpack (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x44B85F: exr_decoding_run (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x38BC5F: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::TileProcess::run_decode(_priv_exr_context_t const*, int, Imf_4_0::FrameBuffer const*, std::__1::vector<Imf_4_0::Slice, std::__1::allocator<Imf_4_0::Slice> > const&) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x388BE1: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::Data::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x388619: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x353755: Imf_4_0::InputFile::Data::bufferedReadPixels(int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x352286: Imf_4_0::InputFile::readPixels(int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x3190FA: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::readMultiPart(Imf_4_0::MultiPartInputFile&, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==    by 0x314C4D: Imf_4_0::checkOpenEXRFile(char const*, unsigned long, bool, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer)
==454==  Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation at 0x483B7F3: malloc (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)

PoC

In the attached archive, you will find:

  • The executable used for our tests.
  • The testcase used to trigger the bug.

To observe the bug, simply run the OSS-Fuzz helper script:

git clone https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz.git
cd oss-fuzz

python3 infra/helper.py build_image openexr
python3 infra/helper.py build_fuzzers --sanitizer=none openexr
python3 infra/helper.py shell openexr

apt update && apt install -y valgrind
ulimit -n 65535
valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer /path/to/poc

Impact

  • Undefined Behavior
  • Potential crash
  • Denial of Service

Credit: Aldo Ristori archive0.zip

Update Note:

Other saved testcases from the fuzzing campaign trigger the same underlying bug, but with a different manifestation. So there is one root cause (missing post-decode validation / zero-init before any unpack), with different call-sites. Below there are several archives, formatted like the previous one, that reproduce the other test cases.

Other observed sinks (distinct manifestations of the same bug):

Deep pointers path: generic_unpack_deep_pointers (deep scanline/tiled) archive1.zip

Deep sample table path: unpack_sample_table (deep scanline) archive2.zip

Half conversion path: half_to_float_buffer_f16c via unpack_half_to_float_3chan_planar archive3.zip

Deep compositing: CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels → ThreadPool::addTask → LineCompositeTask::execute archive4.zip

Risk Scores
Base Score
7.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.37%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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