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GHSA-379q-355j-w6rj
No affected components available
pnpm v10+ Git Dependency Script Execution Bypass
Summary
A security bypass vulnerability in pnpm v10+ allows git-hosted dependencies to execute arbitrary code during pnpm install, circumventing the v10 security feature "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default". While pnpm v10 blocks postinstall scripts via the onlyBuiltDependencies mechanism, git dependencies can still execute prepare, prepublish, and prepack scripts during the fetch phase, enabling remote code execution without user consent or approval.
Details
pnpm v10 introduced a security feature to disable dependency lifecycle scripts by default (PR #8897). This is implemented by setting onlyBuiltDependencies = [] when no build policy is configured:
File: pkg-manager/core/src/install/extendInstallOptions.ts (lines 290-291)
if (opts.neverBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependencies == null && opts.onlyBuiltDependenciesFile == null) {
opts.onlyBuiltDependencies = []
}
This creates an allowlist that blocks all packages from running scripts during the BUILD phase in exec/build-modules/src/index.ts.
However, git-hosted dependencies are processed differently. During the FETCH phase, git packages are prepared using preparePackage():
File: exec/prepare-package/src/index.ts (lines 28-57)
export async function preparePackage (opts: PreparePackageOptions, gitRootDir: string, subDir: string) {
// ...
if (opts.ignoreScripts) return { shouldBeBuilt: true, pkgDir } // Only checks ignoreScripts, not onlyBuiltDependencies
const execOpts: RunLifecycleHookOptions = {
// ...
rawConfig: omit(['ignore-scripts'], opts.rawConfig), // Explicitly removes ignore-scripts!
}
// Runs npm/pnpm install
await runLifecycleHook(installScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
// Runs prepare scripts
for (const scriptName of PREPUBLISH_SCRIPTS) { // ['prepublish', 'prepack', 'publish']
await runLifecycleHook(newScriptName, manifest, execOpts)
}
}
The ignoreScripts option defaults to false and is completely separate from onlyBuiltDependencies. The onlyBuiltDependencies allowlist is never consulted during the fetch phase.
Affected scripts that execute during fetch:
prepareprepublishprepack
Attack vectors:
git+https://github.com/attacker/malicious.gitgithub:attacker/maliciousgitlab:attacker/maliciousbitbucket:attacker/maliciousgit+ssh://git@github.com/attacker/malicious.gitgit+file:///path/to/local/repo
PoC
Prerequisites:
- pnpm v10.0.0 or later (tested on v10.23.0 and v11.0.0-alpha.1)
- git
Steps to reproduce:
-
Extract the attached poc.zip
-
Run the PoC script:
cd poc chmod +x run-poc.sh ./run-poc.sh -
Verify the marker file was created by the malicious script:
cat /tmp/pnpm-vuln-poc-marker.txt
Manual reproduction:
-
Create a malicious package with a
preparescript:{ "name": "malicious-pkg", "version": "1.0.0", "scripts": { "prepare": "node -e \"require('fs').writeFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt', 'RCE!')\"" } } -
Initialize it as a git repo and commit the files
-
Create a victim project that depends on it (just have to make sure it actually git clones and not just downloads a tarball):
{ "dependencies": { "malicious-pkg": "git+file:///path/to/malicious-pkg" } } -
Run
pnpm install- the prepare script executes without any warning or approval prompt
Impact
Severity: High
Who is impacted:
- All pnpm v10+ users
- Users who believed they were protected by the v10 "scripts disabled by default" feature
- CI/CD pipelines
Attack scenarios:
- Supply chain attack: An attacker compromises a dependency, adding to it a malicious git dependency that executes arbitrary code during
pnpm install
What an attacker can do:
- Execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges
- Exfiltrate environment variables, secrets, and credentials
- Modify source code or inject backdoors
- Establish persistence or reverse shells
- Access the filesystem and network
Why this bypasses security expectations:
- pnpm v10 changelog explicitly states "Lifecycle scripts of dependencies are not executed during installation by default"
- Users expect git dependencies to follow the same security model as npm registry packages
- There is no warning that git dependencies are treated differently
- The
onlyBuiltDependenciesconfiguration does not affect git dependencies
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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