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GHSA-36fc-7wjg-mfvj
No affected components available
GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-374
Summary
Multiple locations in Pimcore v11 call PHP's unserialize() on data from database columns and filesystem files without the allowed_classes restriction, enabling object injection if an attacker can control the serialized data source.
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 8.0 (High) — AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Component
- Package:
pimcore/pimcoreandpimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle - Files:
lib/Tool/Authentication.php(line 82) — session token deserializationmodels/Site/Dao.php(line 68) — site domains from databasemodels/DataObject/ClassDefinition/CustomLayout/Dao.php(line 69) — layout definitions from databasemodels/Tool/TmpStore/Dao.php(line 64) — temporary store data from databasemodels/Asset/WebDAV/Service.php(line 36) — delete log from filesystemadmin-ui-classic-bundle/src/Helper/Dashboard.php(line 64) — dashboard config from filesystem
Description
Six locations in Pimcore core call unserialize() directly (bypassing Tool\Serialize) on data sourced from database columns or filesystem files without passing the allowed_classes parameter. This means any class available in the autoloader will be instantiated during deserialization.
If an attacker can write to the data source (e.g., via SQL injection targeting the tmp_store, sites, or custom_layouts tables, or via a file write vulnerability targeting the WebDAV delete log), they can inject serialized PHP gadget chains that execute arbitrary code when the data is deserialized.
This is related to but distinct from the Tool\Serialize::unserialize() issue — these calls bypass the wrapper entirely.
Impact
PHP object injection leading to Remote Code Execution when chained with a data source write vulnerability. Pimcore's dependency tree (Guzzle, Symfony, Monolog, Doctrine) provides numerous known gadget chains.
Proof of Concept
- Identify a writable data source (e.g.,
tmp_storetable via SQL injection, orwebdav-delete.datvia file write) - Write a serialized PHP gadget chain (e.g., Monolog
BufferHandlerchain from phpggc) - Trigger the deserialization (e.g., access a page that reads TmpStore, or trigger a WebDAV operation)
- The gadget chain executes with web server privileges
Suggested Fix
Add allowed_classes parameter to all unserialize() calls. Where no objects are needed, use ['allowed_classes' => false]. Consider migrating to JSON serialization for data that doesn't require object preservation.
// Example fix for Site/Dao.php:
$siteDomains = unserialize($site['domains'], ['allowed_classes' => false]);
// Example fix for TmpStore/Dao.php:
$item['data'] = unserialize($item['data'], ['allowed_classes' => false]);
References
- CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- OWASP Deserialization Cheat Sheet
- phpggc: PHP Generic Gadget Chains
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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