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GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8

MediumCVSS 6.5 / 10
Published Apr 28, 2026·Last modified May 8, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

Fiber cache middleware's default key generator uses only c.Path() and does not include the query string. As a result, requests like /?id=1 and /?id=2 can map to the same cache key and share the same cached response.

This can cause response mix-up (cache poisoning-like behavior) for endpoints where response content depends on query parameters.

Details

Default configuration in cache middleware:

  • KeyGenerator: func(c fiber.Ctx) string { return utils.CopyString(c.Path()) }

References:

  • https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/middleware/cache/config.go#L90-L92
  • https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/middleware/cache/cache_test.go#L599-L621

The existing test demonstrates that when handler output depends on query parameter id, a second request with a different query still returns the first cached response (cache hit), confirming query is not part of the default cache key.

PoC

Minimal PoC:

package main

import (
    "log"

    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3/middleware/cache"
)

func main() {
    app := fiber.New()
    app.Use(cache.New()) // default config

    app.Get("/", func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
        return c.SendString(c.Query("id", "1"))
    })

    log.Fatal(app.Listen(":3000"))
}

Reproduction:

  1. GET /?id=1
    • Cache miss
    • Response body: 1
  2. GET /?id=2
    • Cache hit
    • Response body: 1 (expected 2)

Local verification command used:

go test ./middleware/cache -run Test_Cache_WithNoCacheRequestDirective -count=1

Observed result: test passes, confirming this is current behavior.

Impact

  • Responses that should vary by query parameters can be mixed between requests.
  • In real deployments, this may leak or corrupt user/tenant-specific content if query parameters influence context or data selection.
  • This is deployment-dependent but security-relevant, and not safe-by-default for query-variant responses.

Suggested remediation

  • Change default cache key generation to include path + normalized query string (or canonicalized original URL).
  • Keep ability for custom key generators.
  • Add explicit documentation warning that path-only keying is unsafe for query-dependent responses.
Risk Scores
Base Score
6.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
6.0

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Related Vulnerabilities
  • CVE-2026-30246
    Alias
  • EUVD-2026-27313
    Alias

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