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GHSA-33f5-2c5q-wgwj
Summary
The rmcp library does not validate the resource parameter in OAuth Protected Resource metadata (RFC 9728), allowing a malicious MCP server to redirect OAuth flows to a legitimate authorization server and steal the resulting access tokens.
Details
RFC 9728 specifies two MUST requirements for resource parameter validation:
- Section 7.3: the client MUST ensure that the resource identifier URL it is using as the prefix for the metadata request exactly matches the
resourcevalue in the returned metadata document. - Section 3.3: if the
resourcevalue returned is not identical to the URL the client used, the data MUST NOT be used.
In the current implementation (crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs), the ResourceServerMetadata struct (lines 390–394) does not include a resource field:
struct ResourceServerMetadata {
authorization_server: Option<String>,
authorization_servers: Option<Vec<String>>,
scopes_supported: Option<Vec<String>>,
}
And discover_oauth_server_via_resource_metadata() (lines 1446–1465) proceeds without any resource URL validation.
Recommended fix
- Add the
resourcefield to the struct:struct ResourceServerMetadata { resource: Option<String>, // RFC 9728 REQUIRED field authorization_server: Option<String>, authorization_servers: Option<Vec<String>>, scopes_supported: Option<Vec<String>>, } - Add validation logic after fetching metadata:
let Some(resource_metadata) = self .fetch_resource_metadata_from_url(&resource_metadata_url) .await? else { return Ok(None); }; // RFC 9728: validate that the resource identifier matches our target server if let Some(resource) = &resource_metadata.resource { if resource.trim_end_matches('/') != self.base_url.as_str().trim_end_matches('/') { return Err(AuthError::MetadataError(format!( "Resource metadata mismatch: expected '{}', got '{}'", self.base_url, resource ))); } }
PoC
-
Attacker sets up a malicious MCP server at
fake-mcp.com/mcp. -
At
fake-mcp.com/mcp/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource, the attacker serves metadata declaring:- resource:
real-mcp.com/mcp(the legitimate server) - authorization_servers: the legitimate authorization server(s) of
real-mcp.com/mcp
- resource:
-
Victim configures any MCP client using
rmcpto connect tofake-mcp.com/mcp. -
rmcpfetches the protected resource metadata and, without validating that theresourcefield (real-mcp.com/mcp) differs from the configured server (fake-mcp.com/mcp), initiates an OAuth flow with the legitimate authorization server. -
The victim sees a legitimate authorization prompt and completes the flow.
-
The resulting access token — valid for
real-mcp.com/mcp— is sent tofake-mcp.com/mcpin subsequent requests. -
The attacker captures the token and can impersonate the victim on
real-mcp.com/mcp.
Impact
This is an access token theft vulnerability via OAuth resource metadata spoofing. All MCP clients built on rmcp that rely on OAuth-protected MCP servers are affected. An attacker who tricks a user into connecting to a malicious MCP server can steal valid access tokens for any legitimate MCP server, enabling full impersonation of the victim.
Credit
Jian Cui, Minsun Shim, Zhou Li, Xiaojing Liao University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) University of California, Irvine (UCI)
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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