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GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc
No affected components available
Summary
Pagy::I18n.locale= did not validate its argument before using it as a
path component to load the matching dictionary file (<locale>.yml). An
application that assigns untrusted input to the locale — e.g. the common
pattern Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale] — let that input influence
which file Pagy attempted to load.
Details
The setter stored the value as-is, and the loader joined it into a path and read it:
# gem/lib/pagy/modules/i18n/i18n.rb
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s
end
# ...later, when translating:
path = pathnames.reverse.map { |p| p.join("#{locale}.yml") }.find(&:exist?)
dictionary = YAML.load_file(path)[locale]
Because the locale was used verbatim, a value such as an absolute path or
a ../-style string redirected the lookup outside the locales directory.
Pagy's subsequent structural check (dictionary['pagy']['p11n'])
prevents the file's contents from being returned, so this is not a
direct file read.
Fixed in 43.5.6 by constraining the locale to a BCP 47 shape before use:
LOCALE_PATTERN = /\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s[LOCALE_PATTERN]
end
Any non-matching value (including nil) resolves to the default locale
and never reaches the file lookup.
PoC
In an application that sets Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale], the
loader appends .yml and reads <locale>.yml, so the request param
controls the target path. For example, pointing it at the app's
config/database.yml:
- Send a request with
?locale=../../../config/database(adjust the number of../to reach the app root from the gem'slocales/directory). - Pagy calls
YAML.load_fileon the resulting…/config/database.yml. - The outcome differs by whether that
.ymlexists, is readable, parses as YAML, and has Pagy's expected structure — an existing, readableconfig/database.ymlraises a different error than a non-existent path (which silently falls back to the default locale). This yields a file-existence / readability oracle for.ymlpaths, and the targeted file is read into the process during the attempt.
Impact
Information disclosure (CWE-22 / CWE-200): a file-existence / readability
oracle for .yml paths on the host, plus a server-side read of
attacker-chosen files into the process. The file contents are not
returned in the response.
Only applications that pass unsanitized end-user input into
Pagy::I18n.locale= are affected. Applications that set the locale from
trusted values are not affected.
Patched: pagy 43.5.6.
Workaround (if you cannot upgrade): validate the locale before
assigning it, e.g.
Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale].to_s[/\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/],
or restrict it to your known set of locales.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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