Open-Source Security Intelligence

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.

DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.

Check if your repositories are affected!View on GitHub
Search

GHSA-2rx9-3g3h-c2jv

HighCVSS 7.1 / 10
Published Sep 1, 2026·Last modified Sep 1, 2026
Affected Components(1)
npm logopnpm
12.0.0-alpha.0 – 12.0.0-alpha.5
Description

Summary

A crafted lockfile alias could reach several install-time filesystem joins. With --trust-lockfile or a frozen lockfile, traversal segments could create links outside the intended project or node_modules boundary. This patch validates dependency names and every virtual-store slot before creating directories, links, bins, or hoisted entries.

Security boundary

  • A shared safe-join helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved dependency names before filesystem materialization.
  • Direct and transitive dependency links, package links, bin destinations, and public/private hoist destinations use the same containment rule.
  • Global virtual-store slots validate the complete slot path, including version-derived components, before directory creation.
  • Snapshot slots and package names are checked before store initialization and before the current-lockfile fast path, closing the warm-install bypass.
  • Rejections preserve ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME.

Exploit replay

Before the patch, pacquet install --frozen-lockfile --trust-lockfile accepted a ../../escaped-link dependency key and created a symlink outside the project. With this patch, the same lockfile is rejected before materialization and no outside link is created.

Files changed

  • pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/safe_join_modules_dir.rs defines the shared containment rule.
  • Install, symlink, bin, hoist, virtual-store, and frozen-lockfile paths call that helper before filesystem materialization.
  • The corresponding tests.rs files cover every sink, including warm installs and global virtual-store slots.

Commands run

$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib
PASS: 434 tests
$ cargo clippy --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --all-targets -- --deny warnings
PASS
$ cargo fmt --all -- --check
PASS

Validation

  • Full pacquet package-manager suite: 434 passed.
  • Focused regressions cover direct and transitive aliases, bins, hoists, package names, global virtual-store version traversal, and a poisoned prior-install slot.
  • cargo clippy -p pacquet-package-manager --all-targets -- -D warnings: passed.
  • cargo fmt --all -- --check and git diff --check: passed.

Compatibility

Valid unscoped and scoped dependency aliases continue to work. The reproduced escape was specific to pacquet, so this branch does not change the TypeScript CLI or the lockfile format.

Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).

Upload your SBOM

Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.

Risk Scores
Base Score
7.1

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.5

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Browse More

High severity
Scan your project

Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.

Checkout DevGuard