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GHSA-2phh-27fw-q4gc
Summary
PhpSpreadsheet's Worksheet\Drawing::setPath() validates an external-image URL against an operator-supplied isWhitelisted callback once, on the initial URL only, then fetches it with file_get_contents() using a stream context that does not set follow_location => 0. A whitelisted host that returns an HTTP 302 Location: redirect to an internal target is therefore followed by PHP's HTTP wrapper (default follow_location=1, max_redirects=20) with no re-validation of the redirect hop — defeating the whitelist and yielding a blind SSRF from the server.
This is an unfixed variant of CVE-2026-59931 (GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg, the WEBSERVICE redirect-whitelist-bypass): the follow_location => 0 fix (commit 7ef7b25e) was applied ONLY to Calculation/Web/Service.php; Worksheet/Drawing.php was never touched.
Root Cause
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Worksheet/Drawing.php:
- Scheme allowlist at
:125(/^(http|https|file|ftp|s3):/) permitshttp/https(the redirect-following schemes) and runs on the initial URL only. - Opt-in gate
if (!$allowExternal)at:128(requiressetAllowExternalImages(true); defaultfalse,BaseReader.php:55). - Whitelist check
if ($isWhitelisted !== null && !$isWhitelisted($path))at:131— validates the INITIAL URL only; never re-applied after a redirect. - Stream context built at
:140-152setsuser_agent+header(+ssl.crypto_methodfor https) but omitsfollow_location.git grep follow_locationon tag 5.9.0 yields a single hit —Service.php:45(the CVE-2026-59931 fix) — confirming it was never added toDrawing.php. - Sink
file_get_contents($path, false, $ctx)at:154.
Impact
Blind SSRF from the server: reach and trigger internal GET-driven endpoints, coarse internal reachability/port probing, and reach cloud-metadata endpoints. The fetched body is written to a temp file, checked with isImage() (mime image/*, or application/octet-stream with bin/emf extension), only image dimensions are stored, and the temp file is unlinked — so the response body is not exfiltrated (non-image responses fail isImage()). This is a blind GET primitive, not full response read.
Proof of Concept
- Attacker server
https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.pngreturns302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/. evil.xlsxwithxl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels:<Relationship ... Type=".../image" Target="https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png" TargetMode="External"/>.- Victim:
$r = new Xlsx(); $r->setAllowExternalImages(true)->setIsWhitelisted(fn($p)=>str_contains($p,'trusted-whitelisted.example')); $r->load('evil.xlsx');-> the server-side GET is forced to the internal target despite the whitelist. HTML-reader variant:<img src="https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png">loaded viaReader\Html(Html.php:1237) with the same reader settings.
Attack Chain
- Entry: crafted
evil.xlsx,xl/drawings/_rels/*.relsTargetMode="External",Target="https://trusted.example/redir.png"(whitelisted host). Guard: none (legal external-image relationship). Bypass proof: Target stored verbatim ->$urlatReader/Xlsx.php:1544. - Config: victim loads with
setAllowExternalImages(true)->setIsWhitelisted($cb)where$cballowstrusted.example. Guard:Drawing.php:128opt-in (satisfied) +:131whitelist. Bypass proof: initial URL is whitelisted -> returns true; check runs once on$path. - Fetch/redirect:
file_get_contents(:154) GETs the URL; whitelisted host returns302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/.... Guard: stream context (:140-152). Bypass proof: nofollow_locationkey -> PHP follows the redirect (defaultfollow_location=1,max_redirects=20) with no re-validation. - Impact: server issues a blind GET to the internal target (body temp-filed,
isImage()-checked, dimensions stored, temp file unlinked — body not exfiltrated).
Bypass Evidence
git grep follow_location 5.9.0 -- src/-> single hit atService.php:45;Drawing.phphas none.- CVE-2026-59931's own regression harness (
ServerTest.php+redirect.php: a whitelisted host 302-redirects todirect.php; only afterfollow_location => 0does the fetch stop following it) demonstrates the exact behavior. That fix is present inService.phpand absent inDrawing.php. git grep isWhitelisted 5.9.0 -- src/confirms the callback is applied only atDrawing.php:131(initial$path), never after the redirect.
Affected Versions
>= 5.5.0, <= 5.9.0. The isWhitelisted control being bypassed was introduced in 5.5.0 (commit 50a7552f); present and unfixed on the latest release (5.9.0) and on HEAD (05e99ebf). No post-release fix to Drawing.php.
Suggested Fix
Add 'follow_location' => 0 (and/or 'max_redirects' => 0) to $ctxArray['http'] in Drawing::setPath() (:140-148), mirroring the CVE-2026-59931 fix at Service.php:45; alternatively follow redirects manually and re-run $isWhitelisted on each hop.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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