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GHSA-2m6q-8v3h-jqww
@adonisjs/http-server@adonisjs/http-serverRoute parameters are inserted into generated URLs without URI encoding.
When an application passes untrusted input to a route whose first path segment is dynamic, a value beginning with / can produce a scheme-relative URL. For example:
router.get('/:page', handler).as('pages.show')
response.redirect().toRoute('pages.show', {
page: '/evil.example.com',
})
This generates the following redirect:
Location: //evil.example.com
Browsers interpret this value as an external URL and redirect the user to https://evil.example.com.
Details
The shared createURL() helper is used by route URL builders, including Router.makeUrl() and Response.redirect().toRoute().
Route parameter values were appended without encoding:
if (isDefined) {
uriSegments.push(`${value}${token.end}`)
}
Wildcard parameters had the same behavior:
uriSegments.push(`${values.join('/')}${token.end}`)
The issue does not affect APIs that intentionally accept complete redirect URLs. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled data as a route parameter and use the generated URL as a redirect destination.
Impact
An attacker may craft a link on a trusted application domain that redirects a victim to an attacker-controlled website.
This can facilitate phishing and may be chained with authentication or OAuth flows that rely on trusted redirect destinations.
Applications are affected when they:
- define a route whose first path segment is dynamic; and
- pass request-derived data to that segment when generating a redirect URL.
Patches
Route parameter values are now encoded using encodeURIComponent.
Wildcard values are encoded individually before being joined with /, preserving their intended segment separators:
if (isDefined) {
uriSegments.push(`${encodeURIComponent(String(value))}${token.end}`)
}
uriSegments.push(
`${values.map((value) => encodeURIComponent(String(value))).join('/')}${token.end}`
)
With the fix, /evil.example.com becomes:
/%2Fevil.example.com
Fixes targeting v6 and v7 have been published below.
- https://github.com/adonisjs/http-server/releases/tag/v8.2.3
- https://github.com/adonisjs/http-server/releases/tag/v9.3.0
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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