Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-2jq4-q6vv-4cp3
No affected components available
Summary
When the crawler saves a downloaded file, the destination filename was taken from attacker-influenced input and joined to the downloads directory with no confinement. A filename containing an absolute path (e.g. /etc/cron.d/evil) or ../ traversal escaped the downloads directory, giving an arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled contents. Because the written bytes are attacker-controlled, this escalates to remote code execution (overwriting a shell rc-file, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, a cron entry, or a Python module on the import path).
Affected paths
Two download sinks in crawl4ai/async_crawler_strategy.py:
- HTTP crawler (
AsyncHTTPCrawlerStrategy): the filename is parsed from the responseContent-Dispositionheader by_extract_filename()and written viaaiofiles.open(filepath, 'wb'). Reachable directly via the SDK, and via the unauthenticated Docker/crawlendpoint when anHTTPCrawlerConfigis supplied. - Browser crawler (
AsyncPlaywrightCrawlerStrategy): the download'ssuggested_filename(controllable by the visited page) is joined todownloads_pathand written viadownload.save_as().
The HTTP-strategy sink is reachable pre-auth on the default Docker deployment; both are reachable for SDK users simply by crawling an attacker-controlled URL. The default Playwright crawl path that does not trigger a download is unaffected.
Impact
Arbitrary file write with attacker-controlled content as the user running the crawler, escalating to remote code execution.
Fix
Both sinks now resolve the destination through a single hardened helper (_safe_download_filepath) that reduces the attacker-influenced name to a bare basename (dropping absolute paths and .. components) and re-checks, via realpath, that the resolved path stays inside the downloads root (defeating symlink/TOCTOU escapes). A traversal attempt is rejected; normal downloads are unchanged.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to the patched version (0.9.0).
- Run the crawler as an unprivileged user with a dedicated, isolated downloads directory on a volume with no sensitive paths writable.
- Enable authentication (
CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN) on the Docker server.
Credits
Y4tacker - reported the Content-Disposition path traversal in the HTTP crawler with a clear PoC and a basename + realpath-containment fix recommendation.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard