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GHSA-2hp7-65r3-wv54
No affected components available
Summary
The --address CLI flag (and NORNICDB_ADDRESS / server.host config key) is plumbed through to the HTTP server correctly but never reaches the Bolt server config. The Bolt listener therefore always binds to the wildcard address (all interfaces), regardless of what the user configures.
On a LAN, this exposes the graph database — with its default admin:password credentials — to any device sharing the network.
Version
nornicdb v1.0.39- Built from commit
afe7c9donmain - Platform: macOS (darwin 25.4.0, arm64)
Reproduction
$ nornicdb serve --address 127.0.0.1 --bolt-port 7687 --http-port 7474 ...
Output claims Bolt is on localhost:
Bolt server listening on bolt://localhost:7687
But the actual socket:
$ netstat -an -p tcp | grep 7687
tcp46 0 0 *.7687 *.* LISTEN
$ lsof -iTCP:7687 -sTCP:LISTEN -n -P
nornicdb ... IPv6 ... TCP *:7687 (LISTEN)
HTTP port is correctly bound:
tcp4 127.0.0.1.7474 *.* LISTEN
Reachable from another host on the LAN:
$ nc -z 192.168.x.y 7687
Connection to 192.168.x.y port 7687 [tcp/*] succeeded!
Setting NORNICDB_BOLT_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 or server.host: "127.0.0.1" in config.yaml has no effect on the Bolt listener.
Root Cause
In pkg/bolt/server.go:774-776:
func (s *Server) ListenAndServe() error {
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", s.config.Port)
listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
...
}
bolt.Config (line 474) has no Host/Address/Addr field — only Port. The CLI flag --address is stored in a local variable in cmd/nornicdb/main.go:80 and used to format user-facing log output (line 637–644), but is never copied into boltConfig at line 600–609 when Bolt is initialized.
Since ListenAndServe calls net.Listen("tcp", ":7687") with an empty host, Go binds the wildcard socket on all interfaces.
Suggested Fix
- Add a
Host stringfield tobolt.Config(default"127.0.0.1", matching the CLI flag default). - In
cmd/nornicdb/main.goaround line 601, wire it through:boltConfig.Host = address boltConfig.Port = boltPort - In
pkg/bolt/server.go:775, use the host:addr := net.JoinHostPort(s.config.Host, strconv.Itoa(s.config.Port))
Security Impact
- Default
admin:passwordcredentials + wildcard binding = anyone on the same WiFi can issue arbitrary Cypher queries (read, write, delete nodes) against NornicDB instances running with default setup. - Users following the README will reasonably assume
--address 127.0.0.1(the documented default) binds both protocols to localhost. - Workaround: host-firewall rules (e.g. macOS
pf) blocking non-loopback → 7687. Not discoverable from the docs.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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