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GHSA-27vp-2mmc-vmh3
No affected components available
Summary
The nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract). This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus socket.
Threat scenario: Running Aider, Claude Code, OpenCode or similar tools with "allow bash" policy so that it can invoke arbitrary host tools like make, gcc, etc. to write code.
Reproducer
Here, instead of running a tool like opencode or claude one can just invoke systemd-run, but this is something an agent could be tricked into doing:
$ cd ~/src/myproject
$ nono run -s --allow-cwd --profile claude-code -- \
systemd-run --user -q --wait --collect \
/bin/sh -c "echo oops > ~/Documents/escaped.txt"
$ cat /var/home/test/Documents/escaped.txt
oops
$
Impact
Complete sandbox escape. The unsandboxed sibling process can write anywhere the user can write, spawn arbitrary processes with network access, etc.
Maintainer Context
This issue allows a process running inside the sandbox to escape confinement by interacting with local user-scoped IPC mechanisms and regain the authority already held by the invoking user or service account.
The issue impacts the sandbox’s confinement and blast-radius reduction guarantees for agents and sandboxed tooling. However, exploitation does not provide privilege escalation, cross-user access, or host compromise beyond the permissions already available to the launcher outside the sandbox.
This issue affects the CLI policy layer and bundled sandbox profiles. The underlying core library nono does not ship with policy definitions or agent-facing confinement profiles by default, nor do the language SDKs.
This is considered a serious issue because an AI agent or untrusted command stream operating within the sandbox could abuse the bypass to perform unauthorized or destructive actions using the delegated authority of the launching user.
The root cause was incomplete mediation of local Unix domain socket access within affected sandbox policies. Support for restricting this behavior has since been added and the fix is available in the repository pending release.
CVSS rationale: exploitation requires execution within a locally launched sandboxed process using the authority already delegated by the invoking user or service account (AV:L/PR:L). The issue allows reliable bypass of sandbox confinement and policy guarantees, resulting in high integrity impact (I:H) and limited availability impact (A:L) through destructive actions within the launcher’s existing permissions. However, the issue does not provide privilege escalation, cross-user access, or a change in security scope (S:U).
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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