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GHSA-277c-5vvj-9pwx
No affected components available
Details
1. All Imagick supported Fileformats are served without filtering
The Thumbnail endpoint does not check against any filters what file formats should be served. We can transcode the image in all formats imagemagick supports. With that we can create Files that are much larger in filesize than the original. For example we can create a .txt file for all thumbnails, and we get the text representation of the image.
We can demonstrate that with the pimcore demo:
This Thumbnail is found on the Frontend: https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89.avif (12kb Filesize)
We can generate a text representation by simply changing the file extension: https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89.txt (4.59mb Filesize)
Other (large) fileformats we tested: ftxt, dip, bmp, bmp3, bmp2, farbfeld, cmyk, cmyka, ycbcr, ycbcra and many more (just check imagemagick supported formats)
With that we can fill the available space of a server really easy.
With formats like yaml or json we can also expose exif data of the original image file - could be a concern with gps data in user uploaded images.
TLDR
- we can generate all imagemagick supported formats with all thumbnail configs
- all configs were the format is set to "auto (Web-optimized)" are vulnerable
- private (exif) data can be exposed.
- We can flood the the server with a bunch of files that are a multiple magnitudes of the original thumbnail size (see txt example), for all thumbnail configs, with every image that we find (scriptable)
Proposed Solution
Implement a list of allowed formats that the developer can modify if needed, if a file is requested in another format than listed, pimcore should return either "/bundles/pimcoreadmin/img/filetype-not-supported.svg" or a 404.
pimcore:
thumbnails:
allowed_formats: ['jpg', 'png', 'avif', 'webp', 'gif']
For non-maintained Pimcore versions (<11), the webserver config could be used to only serve files that should be allowed.
2. Non Web optimized file formats (ORIGINAL, JPG, PNG) creates duplicated files on Server
With Thumbnail config that are configured to serve non web optimized file formats (such as ORIGINAL, jpg, png, print, etc) we can create files with arbitrary file formats that are saved to disk.
For example, the thumbnail configuration "print_backgroundimage" (in the pimcore demo) can be used to create files such as:
https://demo.pimcore.fun/Car%20Images/jaguar/3/image-thumb__3__print_backgroundimage/auto-3095119.aaa https://demo.pimcore.fun/Car%20Images/jaguar/3/image-thumb__3__print_backgroundimage/auto-3095119.aab https://demo.pimcore.fun/Car%20Images/jaguar/3/image-thumb__3__print_backgroundimage/auto-3095119.aac
Each request creates a new copy of the original (jpg) thumbnail file. The server can be flooded with a bunch of files.
Code for this mechanism is here: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/blob/11.x/models/Asset/Service.php#L621-L623
Proposed Solution
Use same filtered list from "All Imagick supported Fileformats are served without filtering" and do not copy the arbitrary file to disk, just serve the original image file under the "new" name.
3. Scaling Factor is not limited and can be modified via url
We can scale each thumbnail to an arbitrary factor with @<float>x added to the request url.
For example:
https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89@1x.avif https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89@1.01x.avif https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89@1.08x.avif https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89@2x.avif
If the thumbnail config allows "forced" resizing, we could also do something like:
https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89@192x.avif
Each request will create a new file, flooding the server with more files. If the factor is big enough, we can also max out the CPU with a single request for quite some time (only really a problem with "forced")
In combination with the first vulnerability we can also generate (large) text files for scaled images:
https://demo.pimcore.fun/Sample%20Content/Background%20Images/317/image-thumb__317__standardTeaser/11.8c64bd89@4x.txt (6.6 mb filesize)
Proposed solution
Limit scale factors with an allowlist:
pimcore:
thumbnails:
allowed_scale_factors: [1.25, 1.5, 2, 4]
Impact
All Pimcore Instances are affected, as far as we can see, also all versions
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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