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GHSA-23wf-92cp-8pcj
Summary
The c.Scheme() method in Echo (context.go:162-181) trusts the X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Protocol, and X-Url-Scheme request headers without validating that the value is http or https. The WWWRedirect() and NonWWWRedirect() middlewares use this unsanitized scheme to construct redirect URLs, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary URI schemes into the Location response header.
Affected Components
context.go:162-181-Scheme()method returns attacker-controlled value verbatimmiddleware/redirect.go:172-184-redirectWWW/redirectNonWWWuse unsanitized scheme
Proof of Concept
GET /path HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
X-Forwarded-Proto: javascript
Response:
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Location: javascript://www.example.com/path
Confirmed injectable schemes: javascript, data, vbscript, file, ftp, ssh, telnet, gopher.
Only WWWRedirect() and NonWWWRedirect() (and WithConfig variants) are affected. HTTPSRedirect, HTTPSWWWRedirect, HTTPSNonWWWRedirect are NOT affected (they hardcode https://).
Impact
- Open redirect to arbitrary scheme URLs when app is not behind a proxy that strips
X-Forwarded-Proto - Cache poisoning when behind a CDN that caches redirect responses keyed by path
file://scheme injection could trigger file access in some browser configurations
Suggested Fix
Whitelist scheme in c.Scheme() to only return http or https:
func (c *Context) Scheme() string {
if c.IsTLS() {
return "https"
}
if scheme := c.request.Header.Get(HeaderXForwardedProto); scheme != "" {
scheme = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(scheme))
if scheme == "https" {
return "https"
}
}
return "http"
}
Disclosure
Source code review, manually verified with actual HTTP server. Tested on Echo v5.0.4 (latest master).
Patches
Fixed in github.com/labstack/echo/v5 v5.1.1 and github.com/labstack/echo/v4 v4.15.2. Context.Scheme() now accepts only http, https, ws or wss from the X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Protocol and X-Url-Scheme headers, and falls back to http for any other value (#2953).
Workarounds
Upgrade to a patched version. If you cannot upgrade, have your edge proxy overwrite or remove the X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Protocol and X-Url-Scheme request headers.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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