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EEF-CVE-2026-71397

HighCVSS 8.2 / 10
Published Nov 6, 2026·Last modified Nov 6, 2026
Affected Components(3)
elixir-grpc/grpc
1.0.0
elixir-grpc/grpc
1.0.3
Hexgrpc_server
1.0.0 – 1.0.6
Description

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust memory and crash the node via an oversized client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming request body.

The streaming read clause of 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler':info/3 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy/handler.ex) never checks the configured max_body_size. Only the unary read path enforces that cap. 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy':reading_stream/1 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy.ex) appends every received chunk to its buffer until a complete length-prefixed message arrives. A client can declare a very large message and send it across many small HTTP/2 DATA frames, and the server buffers all of it.

This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.0.6.

Details

1. The cap applies to unary reads only

The commit that added max_body_size checks it in read_full_body/4, which serves unary requests through the {:read_full_body, ref, pid} clause of 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler':info/3. The {:read_body, ref, pid} clause, which serves streaming requests, returns each chunk to the caller with no size check.

2. Unbounded buffering

'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy':reading_stream/1 reads chunks through that clause and appends each one to a binary buffer. It emits a message only when GRPC.Message.get_message/1 finds a complete length-prefixed gRPC message in the buffer. Until then, the buffer grows with every chunk.

3. Memory exhaustion

A client that declares a large message length and keeps sending DATA frames without END_STREAM makes the buffer grow without limit. The BEAM eventually runs out of memory and the node crashes.

Proof of concept

  1. Start a grpc_server endpoint that exposes a client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming RPC method.
  2. Open an HTTP/2 connection and send a request to that method.
  3. Send the request body across many small HTTP/2 DATA frames without END_STREAM, well past the configured max_body_size.
  4. Observe that the server buffers all of it and server memory grows. The equivalent unary call is rejected with RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED.

Impact

An unauthenticated client can crash a grpc_server node through one streaming RPC connection. This takes down every service on that node.

Configurations

The server must expose at least one client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming RPC method.

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Risk Scores
Base Score
8.2

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.

Threat Intelligence
4.6

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.32%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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