DSA-5041-1

Any CA issuer in the RPKI can trick OctoRPKI prior to 1.3.0 into emitting an invalid VRP "MaxLength" value, causing RTR sessions to terminate. An attacker can use this to disable RPKI Origin Validation in a victim network (for example AS 13335 - Cloudflare) prior to launching a BGP hijack which during normal operations would be rejected as "RPKI invalid". Additionally, in certain deployments RTR session flapping in and of itself also could cause BGP routing churn, causing availability issues.

OctoRPKI does not escape a URI with a filename containing "..", this allows a repository to create a file, (ex. rsync://example.org/repo/../../etc/cron.daily/evil.roa), which would then be written to disk outside the base cache folder. This could allow for remote code execution on the host machine OctoRPKI is running on.

OctoRPKI does not limit the depth of a certificate chain, allowing for a CA to create children in an ad-hoc fashion, thereby making tree traversal never end.

OctoRPKI does not limit the length of a connection, allowing for a slowloris DOS attack to take place which makes OctoRPKI wait forever. Specifically, the repository that OctoRPKI sends HTTP requests to will keep the connection open for a day before a response is returned, but does keep drip feeding new bytes to keep the connection alive.

OctoRPKI crashes when encountering a repository that returns an invalid ROA (just an encoded NUL (\0) character).

If the ROA that a repository returns contains too many bits for the IP address then OctoRPKI will crash.

OctoRPKI tries to load the entire contents of a repository in memory, and in the case of a GZIP bomb, unzip it in memory, making it possible to create a repository that makes OctoRPKI run out of memory (and thus crash).

When copying files with rsync, octorpki uses the "-a" flag 0, which forces rsync to copy binaries with the suid bit set as root. Since the provided service definition defaults to root ( https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki/blob/master/package/octorpki.service ) this could allow for a vector, when combined with another vulnerability that causes octorpki to process a malicious TAL file, for a local privilege escalation.

In NLnet Labs Routinator prior to 0.10.2, a validation run can be delayed significantly by an RRDP repository by not answering but slowly drip-feeding bytes to keep the connection alive. This can be used to effectively stall validation. While Routinator has a configurable time-out value for RRDP connections, this time-out was only applied to individual read or write operations rather than the complete request. Thus, if an RRDP repository sends a little bit of data before that time-out expired, it can continuously extend the time it takes for the request to finish. Since validation will only continue once the update of an RRDP repository has concluded, this delay will cause validation to stall, leading to Routinator continuing to serve the old data set or, if in the initial validation run directly after starting, never serve any data at all.

NLnet Labs Routinator versions 0.9.0 up to and including 0.10.1, support the gzip transfer encoding when querying RRDP repositories. This encoding can be used by an RRDP repository to cause an out-of-memory crash in these versions of Routinator. RRDP uses XML which allows arbitrary amounts of white space in the encoded data. The gzip scheme compresses such white space extremely well, leading to very small compressed files that become huge when being decompressed for further processing, big enough that Routinator runs out of memory when parsing input data waiting for the next XML element.