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DEBIAN-CVE-2026-110879
No affected components available
jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes violate the declared type or would be rejected as direct type IDs. This bypasses the generic-argument validation added for CVE-2026-54512 (GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm), of which this is an incomplete fix. DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() checks the outer class against the declared base type and then passes each argument from the type ID to _validateTypeParameter(), which validates the argument against the outer base type rather than enforcing its corresponding declared generic binding. It also invokes validators with arguments that have not passed the subtype check those validators expect. Under the default DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator this accepts an unrelated class inside a generic subtype even when the same class is rejected as a direct type ID. Where an allowIfBaseType(...) rule approves the outer type, Jackson substitutes LaissezFaireSubTypeValidator, so the configured validator no longer restricts the embedded arguments. The element type of a plain array type ID such as [Lpkg.Gadget; is likewise left unvalidated once the array's base type is approved. Affected paths include annotation-based class-name polymorphism with a default Jackson 3.x JsonMapper, configured default typing in both Jackson 2.x and 3.x, and integrations that expose that default typing. The default-validator case requires no application-authored validator: with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS), a direct gadget type ID is rejected as "Not a subtype", while a type ID naming a generic wrapper around the same gadget is accepted and deserialized, including attacker-supplied bean properties. Where class-name default typing permits Map, a property declared as Map<String,String> accepts HashMap<FileSystemXmlApplicationContext,String>; map-key discovery then passes the attacker-controlled JSON property name to the selected class's one-string constructor. With Spring on the classpath and attacker-controlled XML the application can load, that constructor loads the XML and invokes ProcessBuilder.start() under the application account, giving arbitrary command execution. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.10.0 and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0. Releases before 2.10.0 are not affected, because PolymorphicTypeValidator was introduced in jackson-databind 2.10.0.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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