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CVE-2026-48076

MediumCVSS 6.5 / 10
Published Aug 6, 2026·Last modified Aug 7, 2026
Affected Components(4)
open-reception/appointment-booking-software
1.0.1
open-reception/appointment-booking-software
1.0.0
open-reception/appointment-booking-software
1.0.0-rc2
1 / 2
Description

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. The new-client booking flow in versions 1.0.1 and prior consists of three calls: bootstrap-challenge (returns a 16-bit PoW challenge with difficulty=4 leading hex zeroes), bootstrap-verify (validates the PoW and issues a Bearer booking access token), and create-new-client (consumes the token and creates the tunnel and first appointment). The token correctly binds to tenantId, tunnelId, clientPublicKey, and emailHash, but never to channelId. The bootstrap-challenge request schema does not even accept a channelId, and the issued token's payload contains no channel information. Independently, the service function createNewClientWithAppointment checks only channel.archived = false. The channel.isPublic check that protects addAppointmentToTunnel is missing in the new-client path. The combination means: an attacker completes the bootstrap flow normally (16-bit PoW, completes in well under one second on commodity hardware, no rate limiting beyond the throttle store), receives a valid booking access token, and then submits the create-new-client payload with channelId pointing to a private (isPublic = false) channel. The booking lands as CONFIRMED if the target channel has requiresConfirmation = false (the default), otherwise as NEW. The patient-facing UI does not list private channels in its picker (/api/public/channels correctly filters isPublic = true), so the channel ID must be obtained out of band. The companion finding V-10 (schedule endpoint discloses private channels) provides exactly that: a single unauthenticated GET reveals every private channel ID for any tenant. V-10 plus V-11 together make private channels fully reachable to anonymous attackers. As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available.

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Risk Scores
Base Score
6.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.0

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.33%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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