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BIT-oras-2021-21272
No affected components available
ORAS is open source software which enables a way to push OCI Artifacts to OCI Conformant registries. ORAS is both a CLI for initial testing and a Go Module. In ORAS from version 0.4.0 and before version 0.9.0, there is a "zip-slip" vulnerability. The directory support feature allows the downloaded gzipped tarballs to be automatically extracted to the user-specified directory where the tarball can have symbolic links and hard links. A well-crafted tarball or tarballs allow malicious artifact providers linking, writing, or overwriting specific files on the host filesystem outside of the user-specified directory unexpectedly with the same permissions as the user who runs oras pull. Users of the affected versions are impacted if they are oras CLI users who runs oras pull, or if they are Go programs, which invoke github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore. The problem has been fixed in version 0.9.0. For oras CLI users, there is no workarounds other than pulling from a trusted artifact provider. For oras package users, the workaround is to not use github.com/deislabs/oras/pkg/content.FileStore, and use other content stores instead, or pull from a trusted artifact provider.
Measures severity based on intrinsic characteristics of the vulnerability, independent of environment.
No exploitation activity has been observed at this time. Continue routine monitoring.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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